High Frequency Fairness by Haeringer, Guillaume & Melton, Hayden
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
High Frequency Fairness












The emergence of high frequency trading has resulted in ‘bursts’ of orders arriving
at an exchange (nearly) simultaneously, yet most electronic financial exchanges im-
plement the continuous limit order book which requires processing of orders serially.
Contrary to an assumption that appears throughout the economics literature, the tech-
nology that performs serialization provides only constrained random serial dictatorship
(RSD) in the sense that not all priority orderings of agents are possible. We provide
necessary and sufficient conditions for fairness under different market conditions on
orders for constrained RSD mechanisms. Our results show that exchanges relying on
the current serialization technology cannot ensure fairness, including exchanges using
‘speed bumps.’ We find that specific forms of constrained RSD ensure fairness under
certain assumptions about the content of those orders but that the general case nev-
ertheless requires unconstrained RSD. Our results have implications for the design of
trading exchanges.
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1 Introduction
In recent years there has been no shortage of controversy about the fairness of electronic
financial markets in the presence of high frequency trading (HFT). At the root of the problem
are market designs such as the continuous limit order book trading (CLOB) that operate
on a first-come, first-served (FCFS) basis.1 Since FCFS rewards speed, fast traders are
advantaged over slower market participants such as long-term investors, and this is sufficient
for authors like Lewis (2014) to conclude that electronic financial markets are not fair.
While controversy remains about whether fairness requires that no group of market par-
ticipants be able to obtain speed advantages over another (see e.g., Angel and McCabe
(2013)), what is entirely uncontroversial is that under the CLOB equally fast traders ought
to be treated equally. What this means is that when equally fast traders compete for a
resource in the CLOB they all ought to have the same probability of being allocated it. The
way that this uncontroversial form of fairness has been conveyed in the economics literature
is that absent any consideration about the content of traders’ orders, the CLOB is akin to
a random serial dictatorship (RSD) mechanism, that is, concurrent orders are randomly or-
dered before being processed. Budish et al. (2015) for instance, having astutely observed that
computers operate in discrete time, assume that under the CLOB what happens is “random
serial processing of orders that reach the exchange at the exact same discrete time.”2
While the fairness provided by RSD—owing to the fact it ensures all possible permuta-
tions occur with equal probability—makes it a desirable assumption for tie-breaking among
orders received simultaneously by an exchange implementing a CLOB, the reality of tie-
breaking on real exchanges is a different story. When an exchange is designed to process
orders as quickly as possible (as most are) its implementation of the CLOB is better described
as constrained RSD because only a small subset of all possible permutations of orders can
be generated.3
1A very short primer on CLOB trading and its terminology is offered in Section 2.1.
2Li et al. (2019) too suggest the assumption of RSD: “when multiple HFT order messages (limit orders,
market orders, or cancellations) reach the exchange at the same time, they are processed serially in a random
order.” See also for Baldauf and Mollner (2020) for a similar assumption.
3As to the motivation for exchanges seeking to process orders as quickly as possible: Angel et al. (2011),
and MacKenzie and Pablo Pardo-Guerra (2014) have noted that historically exchanges were able to increase
their market share by processing orders more quickly than their competitors. More recently both Menkveld
and Zoican (2017), and Wang (2018) note that exchanges continue to compete on the basis of how fast they
can process participants’ orders. Further supporting this, improvements exchanges have made in their order
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It is the dichotomy between the CLOB, which specifies the processing of orders serially,
and the large inflows of (nearly) simultaneous orders submitted by fast traders that motivates
our work. On exchanges that have been designed to be ‘fast’ (i.e., to minimize the time
taken to process participants’ orders) it is a general purpose computer networking device
known as a network switch that is responsible for imposing an ordering on its output port
on messages it receives simultaneously on its input ports (i.e., traders’ orders).4 If the
exchange is designed to be as fast as possible the priority ordering imposed by the switch
is that in which the participants’ orders are presented to the CLOB (Melton, 2018; Lohr
and Neusüß, 2019). It follows then that the only possible orderings are those the switch is
capable of providing, and those orderings are surprisingly constrained. As Sivaraman et al.
(2016) have noted, “today’s fastest switches, also known as line-rate switches, provide a
small menu of scheduling algorithms: typically, a combination of Deficit Round Robin, strict
priority scheduling, and traffic shaping. A network operator can change parameters in these
algorithms, but cannot change the core logic in an existing algorithm, or program a new one,
without building new switch hardware.” In practice, this means for a switch that has n ports
there are only n distinct possible orderings, and not n! as in RSD. Although switches used
by the industry have deterministic algorithms—given one ordering we can unambiguously
determine the next—the ordering produced by the switch is independent of the signals that
cause traders to submit orders to the exchange (and the content of those orders), so we may
reasonably characterize it as random, and ultimately as a constrained RSD mechanism.
The first message of this paper is that when an exchange is designed to process orders
as quickly as possible its implementation of the CLOB cannot provide fairness. To see this,
consider the simple example of an exchange whose switch has only four ports, and there
are four traders who are submitting simultaneously an order. Trader i is assigned to port
♯i, i = 1, . . . , 4. In this case the switch can only generate four different queues of those
traders, depicted in Table 1. Fairness breaks down because among those four queues trader
i1 is ranked before i2 three times, while i2 is above i1 only once. In other words, whenever
traders’ orders arrive simultaneously there is a systematic bias towards some traders, i.e.,
serialization of orders cannot be fair.
processing speeds feature prominently in their recent marketing materials (CME Group, 2020; Eurex, 2016;
CBOE, 2020; NYSE, 2020).
4On a switch, ports the sockets into which network cables are plugged, onto which messages are sent and
received.
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q1 q2 q3 q4
i1 i2 i3 i4
i2 i3 i4 i1
i3 i4 i1 i2
i4 i1 i2 i3
Table 1: Possible queues for a switch with four ports
The main contribution of this paper is to characterize fairness in constrained RSD mech-
anisms. As a by-product, we show that under current technology when an exchange is
designed to process orders as quickly as possible its implementation of the CLOB cannot
provide fairness.
Our results are obtained by considering a model built upon the standard setup for object
allocation using RSD, which consists of a set of agents and a set of objects where each agent
is endowed with a preference relation over the objects. In the RSD mechanism a queue of
agents is randomly generated (among all possible orderings), and each agent is asked, one at
a time, to pick an object among the objects not chosen by the agents ranked before him in
the queue. Our model departs from this standard description in two aspects. First, unlike
RSD where all possible queues are equally likely we assume that only queues from a set Q,
called a technology, can be realized. It is in this sense that our mechanism is a constrained
RSD. Second, instead of having agents’ preferences over objects we assume right away that
agents derive a payoff from each realized queues in the allocation mechanism. This modeling
approach does not affect our results but it permits us to directly relate fairness to the queuing
technology.
Fairness in the social choice or mechanism design literature is often interpreted as a
synonym of equal treatment of equals regarding agents’ outcomes (Moulin, 2004). In this
paper we follow this principle but consider two different ways to define agents’ outcomes.
One of the rationales for doing so is that electronic trading can be seen as the concatenation
of two mechanisms: a queuing mechanism (the network switch), and a market mechanism
(where traders’ orders are executed). Here the queuing mechanism is meant to allocate
access to the market. We thus consider two notions of fairness: access fairness, which
focuses exclusively on the queuing mechanism, and outcome fairness, which applies to the
complete queuing+market mechanism.
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As its name suggests, access fairness, in line with most current regulations, is based on the
desire that among equally fast traders no trader should be advantaged over any other in the
allocation of resource he or she receives, with the resource to be understood as participating
to the market mechanism. That is, equally fast traders should have the same probability
to be ranked first, second, third, . . . .5 Outcome fairness on the other hand is the standard
notion of equal treatment of equals, which simply requires that two equally fast traders
submitting identical orders should obtain the same expected outcomes. In a classic object
allocation problem an agent’s outcome is the object he receives, and in a trading context the
outcome is the price and quantity at which the trader sold or bought the asset (or whether
his order has been successfully canceled).
We show in this paper that access fairness and outcome fairness differ substantially in
terms of their market design implications. A brief summary of our results is the following.
We show that a technology Q guarantees access fairness if, and only if, the set of possible
queues satisfies a condition we call strong symmetry (Proposition 2). This condition is
a generalization of the symmetry in found for instance in the Condorcet cycle, where for
any rank k in a queue, each trader is ranked k-th as many time as any other trader is
also ranked k-th across all possible queues. Strong symmetry goes further by requiring
that this symmetry condition also holds when the set of queues is restricted to any subset
of traders. A crucial assumption behind this result is that the same queuing mechanism
(i.e., the same switch) is used to rank orders for different instruments or assets, a standard
feature in electronic markets. In an object allocation problem this translates as having
the (constrained) RSD mechanism to generate a unique queue for independent allocation
problems (i.e., with different sets of agents and objects).
For our characterization of outcome fairness we do not require our previous assump-
tion that agents trading different instruments are ordered together by the same technology.
Our model thus fits the ‘standard’ object allocation. Also, we highlight a crucial difference
5A prominent and recent case of market access (un)fairness appears in a disciplinary order by the Securities
and Exchanges Board of India (2019). In this case participants who were otherwise equally fast were not
treated as such by an exchange—some were able to obtain ‘head-starts’ when racing against others by
connecting to faster market data distributors, and similarly some were able to ‘race shorter tracks’ by
connecting to faster order gateways at the exchange than others. The review of this and many other cases of
market access unfairness provided by Mavroudis and Melton (2019) would seem to indicate that the principle
of fair access is ubiquitous across many jurisdictions and asset classes, and that it is of increasing concern
to operators of financial exchanges.
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between object allocation and trading problems when a running a (constrained) RSD mech-
anism. In object allocation problems, for any given queue, the outcome of an agent only
depends on the preferences of the agents ranked before him. Once an agent is allocated
an object the mechanism ends for him and what happens after that has no impact on his
allocation. That is not the case in trading, for the success of a trader’s order may depend
not only on the orders of the traders ranked after him in the queue but also on how those
agents are ranked. Accordingly, we characterize outcome fairness for both the object al-
location and the trading environments. For the former, outcome fairness is guaranteed if,
and only if the queuing technology is strongly balanced (Proposition 3), a condition that
roughly requires that for any two traders the collection of subqueues of traders ranked above
them are identical, up to a permutation of these two traders. This condition is stronger
that strong symmetry. For trading problems we show that outcome fairness is guaranteed if,
and only if the technology is fully balanced, which is a generalization of the strong balanced-
ness condition considering now the entire queues. We later show in the paper that the only
strongly balanced technology is the one made by all possible queues, like in unconstrained
RSD (Theorem 2), and the same holds for fully balanced technologies. In other words, as
long outcome fairness is a concern, RSD cannot be constrained.
Regarding outcome fairness we also investigate the special (and frequent) case when
concurrent orders are made only by liquidity providers.6 This case differ from the general case
(characterized with strongly balancedness) in that traders’ outcomes depend on which traders
are queue before (and thus after) them but not how those traders are ranked. Outcome
fairness is guaranteed in this case if, and only if the technology is weakly balanced. This
property is similar in spirit to balancedness but only requires that for any two traders the
set of traders ranked above them are identical across all possible queues. We show that in
fact weak balancedness is equivalent to strong symmetry (Theorem 1).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we offer a quick description of
the continuous limit order book protocol and an outline of the typical network architecture
of electronic financial markets. Our model is introduced in Section 3. In section 4 we explain
6This case is a bit unusual and perhaps less interesting for the object allocation literature. It roughly
consist of the following situation. The set of agents and objects can both be partitioned into different
subsets, {N1, N2, . . . , Nk} and {X1, X2, . . . , Xk}, respectively (with both partitions having the same number
of elements). For each h, agents in Xh have the same preferences over the objects in Xh, and all objects in
Xh′ , h
′ 6= h are deemed unacceptable.
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how trading fits the allocation model presented in Section 3, discussing the assumptions that
traders’ order are simultaneous, the switch technology and traders’ payoffs (whether liquidity
providers or takers). Access fairness is characterized in Section 5 and Outcome fairness in
Section 6. We conclude this paper In Section 8 by discussing several alternative market
design that aim at improving fairness with CLOB trading protocols.
2 Electronic trading
2.1 Continuous limit order book
We offer here a quick overview of the continuous time limit order book trading protocol.
Readers familiar with it and the accompanying vocabulary can skip this section.
The CLOB protocol is simply a double auction that runs in continuous time. Buyers
and sellers submit buying and selling orders, respectively, which are simple demand and
supply functions consisting of a limit price and a maximum quantity. Prices submitted by
buyers and sellers are traditionally called bids and asks, respectively. That is, a bid is the
maximum price the buyer is willing to pay, and similarly an ask is the lowest price a seller
will accept to sell the asset. The quantity bought or sold by a trader cannot exceed the
quantity set in his order. There are many types of orders that can be submitted by traders,
but the two most common ones are limit orders and market orders. Market orders only
consist of a quantity, the buyer or seller submitting the price will accept any price that is
given by the market. So a market order submitted by a buyer is equivalent to a limit order
with an infinite price (and a price equal to −∞ in the case of a seller).
Orders submitted by traders are not necessarily filled, i.e., the trader may not be able to
buy or sell all the quantity specified in his order. For a buyer, an order is filled if the buyer’s
bid is at least as high as the lowest ask submitted by the sellers, and similarly for the sellers.
Orders that cannot be filled (or that are only partially filled) are stored in the book.7
The standard design for CLOB uses a price-time priority. An incoming buying limit
order that can be filled will be processed first using the lowest ask in the book. If all
the orders corresponding to that lowest ask do not sum up to the quantity asked by the
buyer additional transactions will be made using the next lowest ask, and so on until either
7In certain markets, particularly equities, at the opening of the market books may already contain some
orders, comprising unfilled orders from the pre-opening auction.
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the buyer has bought all the unit he asked or the next lowest ask is higher than his bid.
In this latter case the order is only partially filled and a new order is placed in the book
corresponding to the buyer’s bid and the quantity is his initial submitted quantity minus the
quantity he purchased. Sellers’ orders are processed similarly starting with the highest bid.
The difference between the lowest ask and the highest bid in the book is called the bid-ask
spread.
Traditionally traders are not distinguished between buyers and sellers but between providers
and takers.8 A provider is any trader whose order ends up in the book (in which case we
refer to his order as a active order). A taker is any trader whose order ‘crosses the spread,’
that is, a buyer whose bid is above or equal to the lowest ask in the book, or a seller whose
ask is lower or equal to the highest bid in the book.9
2.2 Exchange architecture
For reasons of risk, cost and interoperability electronic financial exchanges—like most dis-
tributed computer systems designed to perform business-related functions—incorporate var-
ious commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) components into their implementations.10 While in-
clusion of these COTS components is a practical necessity is also not without drawbacks.
Since the computer industry competes largely on the speed at which components operate,
vendors tend to prioritize the pursuit of speed as a design goal over other goals that might
inhibit speed. In the case of fast, ‘line-rate’ network switches—those that are required to
handle the volume and rate at which orders are received on a modern financial exchange—it
is a deliberate design decision made by vendors along exactly these lines to provide only a
handful of simple but fast scheduling algorithms for serializing messages the switch simulta-
neously receives; more sophisticated scheduling algorithms would inhibit the switch’s speed
(Shreedhar and Varghese, 1995; McKeown, 1997; Sivaraman et al., 2016).
To understand the centrality of a network switch to our work in this paper on fairness
8Providers are also called market makers. See Gould et al. (2013) for a nomenclature.
9A taker whose order is only partially filled is then first a taker and then a provider.
10To elaborate: the inclusion of these COTS components: (i) reduces risk because they have been proven
in the field through their wide-usage in many other distributed systems, (ii) reduces costs because although
the specific components used in integration tend to serve a generic purpose they also tend to be difficult
and expensive to design, build and test, and (iii) improves interoperability because standardization of the
interfaces they implement enable straightforward integration with other COTS components, including those
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Figure 1: Architectural view of a modern electronic financial exchange
consider the architectural view in Figure 1 of a modern financial exchange.11 In this figure
market participants are simultaneously sending messages to the network switch component
of the exchange, and that switch is imposing an ordering on those messages as it forwards
them to the matching engine component which hosts limit order books for the instruments
that trade on the exchange.12 Abstracting from jitter, the ordering generated by the switch
is that in which messages are processed in the CLOB.13
11From a software engineering perspective the architectural view provided in this figure is, at an appropriate
level of abstraction, consistent with the published architectures of many real exchanges (CME Group, 2014;
Eurex, 2016; Kluber, 2017; Melton, 2018)
12Switch designers use the term output port contention to describe the situation shown in the figure where
several messages received simultaneously must all be forwarded to the same physical link (Rojas-Cessa,
2016); it is the switch’s scheduling algorithm that performs this ordering function.
13 Melton (2020) provides a discussion of the meaning, nature and causes of jitter in electronic financial
exchanges, but to summarize: jitter in a computer system is the variability in the time taken to perform a
given operation. It is caused by features deeply embedded in both hardware and software that exploit the
spatial and temporal locality in a computer program’s data and instructions that has long been observed to
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3 The model
The usual playground for the random serial dictatorship mechanism (RSD) is the classic
assignment model consisting of a set of objects and a set N of agents (both finite), with each
individual being endowed with a preference relation over the objects. In this mechanism
a queue of agents is randomly generated and each agent chooses, one at a time, an object
among the objects that haven’t been choosen yet.
We make two departures from this description. The first and main departure is that
we assume that not all queues have a positive probability. We assume that there is a set
Q of possible queues, called a technology. Like for RSD, all queues in Q have the same
probability to be realized. We denote by |Q| the number of queues in Q.
Given two queues q = (t1, t2, . . . , tk) and q
′ = (t′1, t
′
2, . . . , t
′
ℓ), we say that q is a subqueue
of q′ if k ≤ ℓ and ti = t
′
i for i = 1, . . . , k. The rank of a trader t in a queue q is denoted
rt(q). For a queue q, the truncation of a queue q at trader t, denoted q|t. For example, if
q = t1, t2, . . . , th−1, th, th+1, . . . , tm then q|th = t1, t2, . . . , th−1.
The second departure we make is that we abstract from the description of set of objects
(and agents’ preferences over objects) by assuming instead that agents have preferences
over queues. This is without loss of generality because each realized queue yields a unique
assignment and agents’ preferences are independent of the assignment of the other agents.
To sum up, a problem is given by a set N of agents, a technology Q, and for each agent
i ∈ N , a payoff function ui : Q → R. Given a technology and payoff profile (ui)i∈N , the







Most of our results essentially rely on a simple identification argument. We will thus
make the assumption that the possible payoff profiles are sufficiently rich so that for any
trader there exists a payoff profile such that for any two distinct queues the trader obtains
different payoffs. We will make this assumption more precise depending on the case we
consider.
exist in its execution so as to make it run more quickly. See also Baldauf and Mollner (2020) for an analysis
of the impact of jitter on market performance.
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4 A trading model
The model we outlined in the previous section is fairly general, with a description more
adapted for the Social Choice literature. We discuss in this section how it can also fit a
trading problem.
4.1 Remark on the simultaneity assumption
There is both empirical evidence and explanatory theory to suggest this phenomenon is
widespread.14 In terms of empirical evidence, Brolley and Zoican (2019) estimate that around
10% of the time a typical exchange is processing ‘bursts’ of orders received substantially
simultaneously. On specific exchanges: We observe that on Refinitiv Matching, of all the
millisecond timestamps in which orders were received in 2014-2015, approximately 7% of
those timestamps contained a plurality of orders15; Lohr and Neusüß (2019) observe on Eurex
that there are many millions of instances of a plurality of orders being received within a few
nanoseconds of one another; Aquilina et al. (2020) observe on the London Stock Exchange
that 20% of trading volume involves a plurality of orders received with 5-10 microseconds of
one another; and Menkveld (2018) observes on NASDAQ that around 20% of trades involve
a plurality of orders received within a sub-millisecond window.
14In terms of the explanatory theory of why exchanges receive bursts of orders from fast traders, there are
two that are relevant to our work: one involves the submission of orders that are competing for the same
resource, and the other involves the submission of non-competing orders. Farmer and Skouras (2012) note
that responsive to a publicly observable signal a plurality of fast participants may submit competing orders
to (i) remove liquidity (e.g., because of mispriced bid or offer in the CLOB), or (ii) to obtain a favorable
queue position in the CLOB when providing liquidity by submitting a bid or offer at the same price-level in
it. R. Roth (2019) notes that a burst of orders may result from a liquidity provider updating their bids and
offers on an option chain responsive to a change in the chain’s underlying cash instrument—in this case the
orders are not competing with one another, and the explanation naturally generalizes to any instruments
with correlated pricing. The two explanatory theories, of course, are not incompatible and as is further
noted by R. Roth (2019), a burst of orders may contain a mix of competing and non-competing orders from
a plurality of participants.
15Source: author’s own analysis of Refinitiv Matching in his capacity as a Refinitiv employee.
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4.2 Queuing technologies
Since orders are processed serially, one at a time, orders arriving simultaneously at the
exchange must be ordered into a queue.16 Those queues are generated by a switch, a device
containing several ports to which traders are assigned and that receive traders’ orders, and
one additional port through which orders will be sent to the matching engine.17 In very
simplified terms switches operate as follows. Upon their arrival to a switch’s port orders are
buffered at the port level until they are forwarded to the matching engine. Switches visit
ports one at a time (with each visit consisting of flushing the corresponding buffer) following
a sequence determined by the switch’s design. Importantly, trading events and the switch
status (i.e., which port is currently visited by the switch) are independent. So, from the
perspective of traders’ at any moment each port has equal probability to be the first one to
be open at the time the traders’ orders arrive at the exchange.
Example 1 (circular switch) Of the switch scheduling algorithms the only one that ‘at-
tempts’ to provide equal treatment of messages received simultaneously is the deficit Round-
robin.18 Ignoring the deficit aspect of the algorithm its Round-robin aspect is simply a circular
shift on the switch’s ports.19 What this means is that if we label those ports 1 through n
the priority in which simultaneously received messages will be processed can be expressed
in terms of the following n permutations of those port numbers: [1,2,3,. . . ,n], [2,3,. . . ,n,1],
. . . , [n− 1, n,1,2, . . . , n− 2], and [n,1,2, . . . , n− 2, n− 1].
As an illustration, asssume that there are as many ports as traders, with trader i assigned
to port ♯i, i = 1, . . . n.20 A circular switch will visit port ♯1 through port ♯n, and then start
16The natural terminology would be to refer to orderings of traders’ orders. To avoid any confusion with
the financial terminology ‘orders’ will always refer to traders’ buy/cancel messages and ‘queues’ to linear
orderings of those orders manifested as messages.
17The matching engine in a an electronic trading exchange is the processor where traders’ orders will be
executed.
18To abstract away from the notion of a switch we subsequently refer to these scheduling algorithms as
queuing technologies, and the orderings they produce as queues.
19For the interested reader, the deficit aspect of the algorithm seeks to rectify unfairness in network
bandwidth allocation by the switch that would otherwise occur in the round robin aspect when the size of
messages received by the switch vary by sender (Shreedhar and Varghese, 1995). Throughout this work it
is our implicit and optimistic assumption that messages are of equal size and that each is an order sent to
the exchange by a trader. Under these assumptions deficit round robin in the switch implies plain old round
robin on orders in the CLOB.
20In practice many traders may be assigned to a same port, or the a single trader may occupy multiple
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over at port ♯1. If, for instance, at the time traders’ orders arrive the switch is currently
visiting, say, port ♯k, then trader ik’s order will be the first to be forwarded to the matching
engine, followed by trader ik+1’s order (who arrived at port ♯k + 1), . . . trader in’s order,
trader i1’s order, . . . and trader ik−1’s order will be the last order received by the matching
engine.
Hence, depending on which port is currently being visited at the time traders’ orders
arrive at the switch, we have then n possible queues, depicted in Table 2. Readers familiar
with the Social Choice literature will recognize this collection of queues as a Condorcet cycle.
q1 q2 q3 . . . qm−1 qm
i1 i2 i3 · · · im−1 im
i2 i3 i4 · · · im i1







im i1 i2 · · · im−2 im−1
Table 2: Queues in circular switch
Upon the arrival of traders’ orders each port has equal probability to be the port currently
visited by the switch, so each queue in the Condorcet cycle occurs with probability 1
m
.
Example 1 illustrates the difference between the ‘standard’ RSD, where there are n!
possible queues of traders, each with probability 1
n!
, and the RSD implemented by high
speed switch, where the number of possible queues is vastly reduced.
4.3 Traders’ outcomes
When considering trading the payoff function u(·) may take different forms, depending on
whether t is a taker or a provider, although for both takers and providers it will depend on
the book at the time their order is being processed, i.e., on how the book has been updated
with the execution (or not) of the orders of the traders that were ranked before.
For clarity we outline now possible forms that the function ut(·) may take, depending
on whether the trader t is a taker or a provider. For simplicity we will consider the case of
liquidity takers buying security X and providers canceling their active (selling) orders. We
ports. We leave aside such complications.
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abstract from quantities in traders’ orders, focusing only on the bids and asks.21 To this end,
denote by B the CLOB at the time traders submit their orders and a0 the lowest ask in B.
Since we focus on the case of traders sending buying orders or canceling selling orders a LOB
is simply a distribution fB over [a0,∞) that indicates, for each price level, how many selling
limit orders where submitted at that price. The execution of traders’ orders will modify the
book. For a sequence q = (i1, i2, . . . , ik) of traders’ orders we denote by B(q) the book after
the orders i1, i2, . . . , ik have been processed. The lowest ask is B(q) is denoted a(B(q)).
4.3.1 Providers’ outcomes
Providers’ do not necessarily have the same active orders. Hence, whether they manage to
cancel their orders depend on how the value of the lowest ask in the book when their order
is processed and the price they ask. To this end, let p be a provider and let ap the ask in
provider p’s active order. Providers’ payoffs are normalized to 1 if they managed to cancel
their order and to 0 otherwise (i.e., a taker bought the instrument from them). So for any





0 if a(B(q|p)) > at
1 if a(B(q|p)) ≤ at
(2)
Note that the payoff description in Eq. (2) takes some liberty with the standard CLOB
trading protocol that uses a price-time priority rule. In the standard CLOB design if two
providers posted the same ask it is the oldest provider who will be matched with the taker.
To see this consider a queue q = (t1, t2, . . . , tk−1, tk, t) such that tk is a taker and p is a
provider and
a(B(t1, t2, . . . , tk−1)) = at
a(B(t1, t2, . . . , tk−1, tk)) = at.
This implies that there are at least two providers who asked the price at who haven’t cancelled
yet when tk’s order was processed. By setting ut(q) = 1 we implicitly assume that provider
t’s order is necessarily the most recent among all the providers who ask for a price equal
to at.
21Not taking into account quantities in traders’ orders has no impact here. Also, note that in practice for
most securities orders are usually of the same size.
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4.3.2 Takers’ outcomes
Each taker t ∈ T submits a limit order with bid bt. A taker arriving just after trader tk will
thus buy the instrument only if a(B(q)) ≤ bt. Note that for any two queues q, q
′ such that
q ⊂ q′, we have a(B(q)) ≤ a(B(q′)).
Similarly to providers, takers’ outcomes depend on the the book at the time their order is
processed, which in turns depends on the set of takers and providers that are ranked before
them. Hence,
q|t is a subqueue of q
′|t ⇒ ut(q) ≥ ut(q
′). (3)
This definition of takers’ outcomes encompasses different metrics. A first natural metric is
the price at which a trader will be served. For instance, if each taker only buys one unit of





v(a(B(q|t))) if a(B(q|t)) ≤ bt
C if a(B(q|t)) > bt
(4)
where C is a constant with C > at and vt is strictly decreasing. If a taker t arrives too
late, then his order will not be succesful. Setting that the price is get is equal to some
large constant C is without loss of generality as long as we are interested in having takers
obtaining, in expectation, the same price. Otherwise one needs for modify Eq. (1) by taking
the expectation conditional on being served.
Another metric is simply looking at whether a taker is served (still assuming that the
taker only buys one unit of the instrument),
u(q) = 1a(B(q|t)≤at (5)
Note that the specification given by Eq. (4) guarantees that if two traders obtain the same
expected “price” then their expectation of being served is also the same. This would not be
the case if we would look at the expected price conditional on being served.
5 Access fairness
The simplest form of fairness boils down to whether traders have equal chances to be ranked
first, second, . . . in the realized queue. This notion fairness can be generalized at no cost by
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assuming that traders’ payoffs only depend on their positions in the queue. Thus, we assume
that for each trader there is a payoff v : Q :→ R such that for any two queues q, q′ ∈ Q,
ri(q) = ri(q
′) ⇒ vi(q) = vi(q
′).
Since vi(q) only depends on ri(q) for all q and all traders i ∈ N , abusing notation we will
sometime write vi(k) to denote vi(q) for ri(q) = k.
Given a queue q ∈ Q, and two traders i, j ∈ N , let qi↔j denote the queue q where i and






ri(q) if h = j
rj(q) if h = i
rh(q) if h 6= i, j
(6)
and denote by Qi↔j = ∪q∈Qq
i↔j. We say that two traders i, j ∈ N are symmetric if
vi(q) = vj(q
i↔j) for all q ∈ Q.
For this section we make the following assumption. Among the n traders who simulta-
neously submit an order to an exchange of particular interest is the subset of the traders
who submit orders for the same financial instrument, say, X. The other traders have orders
for a different instrument (but that is traded at the same exchange). This assumption is in
line with the current practice in electronic exchanges where various instruments are traded
on the same matching engine (i.e., the same processor). Hence, traders buying and selling
different instruments are ordered in the same queues by the same switch. We call traders
trading instrument X essential traders. The presence of essential traders implies that
their payoffs for a given queue q only depends on the subqueue q restricted to the essential
traders.
Given a technology Q, where Q = {q1, q2, . . . , qk} and a set S ⊆ N of traders we denote
by QS the collection of queues {qS1 , q
S
2 , . . . , q
S
k } such that for each q
S
h , h = 1, . . . , k, q
S
h is a
restriction of qh to the set S, i.e., for each pair of traders t, t
′ ∈ S, rt(q
S
h ) < rt′(q
S
h ) if, and
only if rt(qh) < rt′(qh).




Definition 2 A technology guarantess access fairness if for any payoff profile (vi)i∈N , and
any two symmetric traders i, j ∈ N ,
EQ(vi) = EQ(vj). (7)
5.1 Trading considerations
From a trading perspective access fairness can also capture the situation where all the traders
competing for the instruments are liquidity takers who submit the same order.22 This is for
instance the case analyzed by Budish et al. (2015), where takers are high frequency traders
and provider traditional (slower) investors.
The next lemmata formalize this. They are immediate consequences from the fact that
takers are all symmetric, so their proofs are omitted.
Lemma 1 Let Q be a technology, and assume that T 6= ∅ and P = ∅. For any t ∈ T such
that rt(q) = rt(q
′) for q, q′ ∈ QT , then for any book B and traders’ orders a(q|t) = a(q
′|t).
Lemma 2 Let Q be a technology, and assume that T 6= ∅ and P = ∅. For any t, t′ ∈ T and
q, q′ ∈ QT such that rt(q) = rt′(q
′), rt(q
′) > rt′(q
′) and rt′(q) > rt(q), we have, for any book
B, ā, a(q|t) = a(q
′|t′).
More generally, in the case where fast takers are ‘sniping’, i.e., competing against similarly
fast providers who are seeking to cancel their active bids or offers, one can view a provider
seeking to cancel her own order to be equivalent to that provider sending a marketable order
to match against her own bid or offer. While much of the literature makes a distinction
between a provider’s cancellation and takers’ marketable orders (see e.g., Budish et al. (2015)
and Baldauf and Mollner (2019)) both have the same effect of removing liquidity from the
book, that is, causing a previously active order to become inactive —as in Wuyts (2012)
or Mounjid et al. (2019). Crucially though, as both Farmer and Skouras (2012) and Li
et al. (2019) have independently observed, the economic consequences for a provider are
equivalent: if one views the provider’s cancel as just that their loss is zero; if one views the
22This case is more interesting than the providers-only case because traders’ outcomes worsen as their
position in the queue gets lower; if there were only providers canceling their orders any technology that
consists of always ranking all providers would be trivially fair.We will consider the case where there are only
providers (with non-cancelling orders) in Section 6.3.
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provider’s cancel instead as a taker order then their loss is also zero because their profit on
the taker order is exactly equal to their loss on their provider order.23
5.2 Characterizing fair access technologies
Access fairness intuitively requires that all traders have the same rank distribution over the
queues in Q, that is, there are as many queues ranking a trader t in position k as there are
queues ranking any other trader t′ in position k, for k = 1, . . . , n. The next example shows
that this is not enough. Fairness breaks down in a constrained serial dictatorship mechanism
as soon as the set of essential traders is a strict subset of the set of traders.
Example 2 There are four traders, i1, i2, i3 and i4. Traders i1 and i2 are essential traders,
while i3 and i4 trade another instrument (so i3 and i4’s orders do not affect the book for
instrument X and thus i1 and i2’s payoff).
The technology we consider is the Condorcet cycle, which corresponds to the Round-
robin switch we described in Example 1. There are four ports, g1, g2, g3 and g4, and traders
i1, i2, i3 and i4 are assigned to ports g1, g2, g3 and g4, respectively. The technology Q is made
of the four queues depicted in Table 3.
q1 q2 q3 q4
i1 i2 i3 i4
i2 i3 i4 i1
i3 i4 i1 i2
i4 i1 i2 i3
Table 3: Circular switch with four traders
Note that trader i1 is ranked first among the essential traders three times out of four.
23One might argue that the consequences are not equivalent because in one case there is a transfer of
profit from one group of participants (providers) to another (takers) when a cancel does not succeed. In
reality however, the roles of provider and taker are not fixed and a participant alternate roles dynamically.
Empirically Dahlström (2019) finds that high-speed ‘makers’ are actually net beneficiaries of latency arbitrage
because besides canceling their own quotes, they also simultaneously act as takers by sending marketable
orders on others’ stale quotes.
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For instance vi1(q4) = vi1(q
{i1,i2}




(3v(1) + v(2)) and EQ(ui2) =
1
4
(v(1) + 3v(2)) ,
which implies that this technology cannot be fair.
The technology of Example 2 fails to be fair for a lack of symmetry in the queues regarding
traders i1 and i2. To see this, notice that the case in the example is equivalent to the one
where there are only takers t1 and t2, but with the technology Q














i1 i2 i1 i1
i2 i1 i2 i2
While Q treats each trader equally (they have equal probability to be ranked at any
position), it fails to do so when we consider only traders i1 and i2. Since the technology
must work for any set of takers one needs a symmetry property that holds for any set S of
essential traders, which we introduce now.
Definition 3 A technology Q is symmetric if for any pair of traders i, j ∈ N
|{q ∈ Q : ri(q) = k}| = |{q ∈ Q : rj(q) = k}| for all k = 1, . . . , n, (8)
and a technology Q is strongly symmetric if for any set S ⊆ N of traders the technology
QS is symmetric.
Our definition of symmetry compares traders, for each rank, but does not compare how
many times traders are ranked for different ranks. It turns out that this if a technology Q
is symmetric then each trader is ranked the same number of times for each rank.
Proposition 1 If a technology Q is symmetric then for any traders i ∈ N ,
|{q ∈ Q : ri(q) = k}| = |{q ∈ Q : ri(q) = k
′}| for all k, k′ = 1, . . . , n. (9)
Proof. There is necessarily a queue q ∈ Q and a trader i ∈ N such that ri(q) = 1. Let
z = |{q ∈ Q : ri(q) = 1}|. Since Q is symmetric then |{q ∈ Q : rj(q) = k}| = z, for
all j ∈ N , and thus there are z|N | queues in Q. Without loss of generality suppose that
for some rank h and trader i ∈ S we have |{q ∈ Q : ri(q) = h}| = z
′ < z. Since Q is
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symmetric |{q ∈ Q : rj(q) = h}| = z
′, for all j ∈ N . So there are z′|N | < z|N | queues in
Q, a contradiction. The case if z′ > z is similar. 
Our richness assumption regarding access fairness is the following.
Assumption 1 (rich payoffs) For any trader i ∈ N , there exists a payoff profile (vj)j∈N
such that for any two queues q, q′ ∈ Q with ri(q) 6= ri(q
′), vi(q) 6= vi(q
′).
We are now ready to characterize fair market access technologies.
Proposition 2 A technology Q guarantees access fairness if, and only if Q is strongly
symmetric.
Proof. That a strongly symmetric technology guarantees access fairness is straightfor-
ward. We only show the converse. Let S ⊆ N be a set of essential traders, and let Q be a
























Since i and j are symmetric we have vi(k) = vj(k) for all k. Also, S being a set of essential




















π(j, k)v(k) , (13)
where
π(i, k) =
∣∣{q ∈ QS : ri(q) = k}
∣∣ .
Since Eq. (13) must holds for any profile (vi)i∈N , by identification we obtain
π(t, k) = π(t′, k), for k = 1, . . . , n.
That is, QS must be symmetric and thus Q is strongly symmetric. 
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6 Outcome fairness
When considering agents’ outcome there is a crucial difference between the standard object
allocation and trading. In the context of object allocation with (constrained) RSD as the
allocation mechanism, for any realized queue an agent’s outcome only depends on the sub-
queue up to that agent. The relative ranking of the agents that are ranked below him has
no impact on his payoff.24 This property does not hold for electronic trading, however, for a
trader’s outcome may also depend on the relative ranking of traders that are ranked below
him. The following example illustrates this point.
Example 3 There are two sellers, s1 and s2 and two buyers, b1 and b2. All buyers and
sellers submit an order for the same quantity. The prices proposed by s1, s2, b1 and b2 are
$14, $11, $12, and $13, respectively. Consider the following two queues,
q = s1, b1, s2, b2 and q
′ = s1, b1, b2, s2 .
For b1 the subqueues obtained from q and q
′ by only considering the traders above him are
identical. So in an object allocation problem b1 should receive the same outcome for both q
and q′. That is not the case in a trading context. Under both q and q′ trader b1 is a provider,
i.e., his order cannot be executed and is thus stored in the book. Under q trader s2 is a
liquidity taker. His order will cross the spread thus b1 will buy the instrument (for a price
equal to his bid, $12). Under q′ trader b2 is a liquity provider and thus his order is stored in
the book. Then comes s2 who will sell to b2 at a price of $13. Hence, b1 will not manage to
buy the instrument under q′.
In object allocation problems two agents are said to be symmetric if they have the same
preferences over the objects. In the context of trading two traders i and j are symmetric
if they submitted the same order.25 Since we are working here with payoffs depending on
queues this translates as two traders having the same payoff function over queues. Note that
since a queue is an ordering of all agents, for any queue two supposedly symmetric agents
will have different position on that queue, and thus their outcomes may not be equal. The
following defines agents’ symmetry when payoffs are defined over queues.
Definition 4 Two traders i, j ∈ N are symmetric if ui(q) = uj(q
i↔j) for all q ∈ Q.
24see for instance Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez (1998).
25So a taker and a provider cannot be identical in our setup.
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Note that uj(q
i↔j) denotes the payoff that j would obtain if he had taken i’s position in
the queue q (and i took j’s position). If i and j have the same preferences over objects or i
and j are traders who submitted the same order then j would obtain under qi↔j the same
outcome as i would get under q.
Definition 5 A technologyQ guarantees outcome fairness if, for any payoff profile (ui)i∈N ,
and any two symmetric traders i, j ∈ N
EQ(ui) = EQ(uj). (14)
6.1 Outcome fairness for object allocation
We consider here the standard setup for object allocation, which means that for any agent
and any realized queue his outcome only depends on the subqueue up to him. Formally, we
assume here that for any trader i ∈ N and queues q, q′ ∈ Q, if q|i = q
′|i then ui(q) = ui(q
′|i).
In this context our richness assumption is the following.
Assumption 2 (rich payoffs) For any trader i ∈ N , there exists a payoff profile (uj)j∈N
such that for any two queues q, q′ ∈ Q with q|i 6= q
′|i, ui(q|i) 6= ui(q
′|i).
For any two traders i and j, we denote by q|i↔jj the queue q that is first truncated at j
and then i and j are swapped. That is, q|i↔ji = q|i if j /∈ q|i, and otherwise q|
i↔j
i is such that







rh(q|i) if h 6= i ,
rj(q|i) if h = i .
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Definition 6 A technologyQ is balanced if for any pair i, j of traders, {q|i}q∈Q = {q|
i↔j
j }q∈Q .
In other words, a technology is balanced if any queue q truncated at i can be mapped
uniquely to a queue truncated at j that is identical, up to a permutation of i and j.
We are now ready to characterize outcome fairness.
Proposition 3 A technology Q guarantees outcome fairness if, and only if Q is balanced.
Proof. Showing that a balanced technology guarantees outcome fairness is straightforward
and is left to the reader. We prove the converse. Let Q be a technology that guarantees
22




























Note that for q ∈ Q, if i /∈ q|j then q|j = q|
i↔j
j , and since i and j are symmetric, uj(q|j) =
ui(q|
i↔j
j ). Similarly, if i ∈ q|j then i and j’s symmetry implies uj(q|j) = ui(q|
i↔j
j ). Hence,




















j ) . (17)
Note that for the first sums of the left-hand side and right-hand side i’s payoff is calculated
for similar types of subqueues, i.e., subqueues of the form h1, h2, . . . , hk, with j 6= hk for
ℓ = 1, . . . , k.27 Similarly, the second sums of both sides are over subqueues of the form
h1, h2, . . . , hk, with j = hℓ for some ℓ = 1, . . . , k. Hence, Assumption 2 implies using an
identification argument that {q|i}q∈Q —from the left-hand side of Eq. (17)— is the same
as {q|i↔jj }. That is, Q is balanced. 
Proposition 3 is relatively intuitive. If i and j are symmetric traders, then for any q ∈ Q
we must have ui(q|i) = uj(q|
i↔j
i ). Symmetry is thus guaranteed if for any subqueue q|i in Q,
the subqueue q|i↔ji is also in Q, which is ensured by balancedness.
6.2 Outcome fairness for trading
We now consider the more general case when a trader’s payoffs may not only depend on the
relative ordering of the traders ranked above him but also on the relative ordering of the
agents ranked below him. The richness assumption then becomes the following.
Assumption 3 (rich payoffs) For any trader i ∈ N , there exists a payoff profile (uj)j∈N
is such that for any two distinct queues q, q′ ∈ Q, ui(q) 6= ui(q
′).
27The first sum of the left-hand side is for queues q ∈ Q such that i is ranked below j, i.e., i /∈ q|j . For
those queues the sum calculate ui(q|
i↔j




The concept of balancedness can easily be extended to this case, except that now we
consider the entire queues in Q.
Definition 7 A technology Q is fully balanced if for any i, j ∈ N and q ∈ Q, {q}q∈Q =
{qi↔j}q∈Q.
We then easily obtain an analog of Proposition 3.
Proposition 4 A technology Q guarantees outcome fairness if, and only if Q is fully bal-
anced.
The proof is similar to that of Proposition 3. The main difference is relative to the






























Then from Assumption 3 and by identification we obtain that Q must be fully balanced.
In appareance fully balancedness looks like being more demanding than balancedness.
We show in Section 7.2 that these two concepts are actually equivalent.
6.3 Competing providers
A special case of the situation analyzed in the previous section is when the burst of orders
received by the exchange consist of non-competing orders, that is, when none of the orders
submitted by the traders cross the spread and thus they are all providers (who are not
necessarily canceling their orders).
This case is not as hypothetical as it may seem; it is in fact relatively common for an
exchange to receive burst of non-crossing orders (i.e., a batch of orders with a least one bid
and one ask such that the ask is at least as high as the bid). For instance, for 2014 and
2015 there are 41,981,349 and 66,163,815 instances where Refinitiv received burst of orders
within a millisecond timestamp. Out of those, only 44,938 and 52,687 (for 2014 and 2015,
respectively) contained crossing orders, i.e., less than 0.1% of the time.
We generalize the problem by assuming that traders’ orders may differ and orders are
not necessarily from the same side of the market, i.e., some may be buying orders and others
24
selling orders. In this case providers’ outcomes depart from the definition outlined in Section
4.3.1 because a provider’s outcome ultimately depends on the orders received before and after
him.28 Note, however, that the relative ranking of the orders above his, as well as the relative
ranking of the offers ranked below his, do not have any impact on the providers’ outcome.
Hence, a sufficient statistic to capture a provider’s outcome is the set of orders ranked above
his.
To this end, given a technology Q and a queue q ∈ Q, denote by Ui(q) the upper-contour
set of trader i in q, Ui(q) = {j ∈ N : rj(q) < rj(q)}, and let Ui(Q) = ∪q∈QUi(q). When all
traders are providers we have
Ui(q) = Ui(q
′) ⇒ ui(q) = ui(q
′) . (20)
The richness assumption in the case where there are only providers is the following,
Assumption 4 (rich payoffs) For any trader i ∈ N , there exists a payoff profile (uj)j∈N
such that for any two queues q, q′ such that Ui(q) 6= Ui(q
′), ui(q) 6= ui(q
′).





S if i, j /∈ S
S ∪ {j}\{i} if i ∈ S, j /∈ S
S ∪ {i}\{j} if i /∈ S, j ∈ S
S if i, j ∈ S
We denote by Ui↔ji (Q) = ∪q∈Q(Ui(Q))
i↔j.




In short, in a weakly balanced technology the upper-contour sets across all queues of any
two traders must coincide, up to a permutation of these two traders.
Proposition 5 Let the set of traders be only composed of liquidity providers. A technology
Q guarantees outcome fairness if, and only if, Q is weakly balanced.
28A providers’ outcome may depend from the orders received after a his if at a later date the provider
seeks to cancel. The more orders with a lower ask (if it is a selling order, or a higher bid if it is a buying
order) will give higher chances to the provider to cancel before being sniped by takers.
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Proof. The if part is straightforward. We show the only if part. Let Q be a fair














































Note that for q ∈ Q such that i /∈ Uj(q), since i and j are symmetric, wj(Uj(q)) =
wi(Uj(q)). If q is such that i ∈ Uj(q), then, again from i and j being symmetric, wj(Uj(q)) =
















wi(S ∪ {j}\{i}) . (25)
Observe that the firs sums of the left-hand side and right-hand side are over similar sets,
i.e., sets S such that j /∈ S, and similarly for the second sums of each side (i.e., sets S such
that j ∈ S). So from Assumption 4 and using an identification argument the first (resp.
second) sums of both sides of Eq. (25) are over the same sets, which implies that Q is weakly
balanced. 
7 Comparing technologies
7.1 Strong symmetry and weak balancedness
Balancedness is obviously a more stringent requirement than weak balancedness. The follow-
ing example shows that when both providers and takers are competing weak balancedness
is not enough to ensure fairness.
26
Example 4 There four traders, p1, p2, t3 and t4, each selling or buying one unit of instrument
X. Providers p1 and p2 have an order in the book with an ask equal to $1 and $2, respectively.
There are two additional asks in the book at $3 and $4. Takers t3 and t4 submit a limit
order with a bid equal to $4.
Table 4 represents a strongly symmetric technology with four traders. The last two rows
give the price at which takers t3 and t4 will buy the instrument for each possible queue,
respectively.
q1 q2 q3 q4 q5 q6 q7 q8 q9 q10 q11 q12
p1 p2 t3 t4 p1 p2 t3 t4 p1 p2 t3 t4
t3 p1 p1 p1 t4 t4 p2 p2 p2 t3 t4 t3
t4 t3 p2 t3 p2 p1 t4 t3 t4 p1 p1 p2
p2 t4 t4 p2 t3 t3 p1 p1 t3 t4 p2 p1
t3 2 3 1 2 3 3 1 3 4 1 1 2
t4 3 4 3 1 2 1 3 1 3 3 2 1
Table 4: strongly symmetric technology for n = 4.






, respectively. So Q is not fair.
The cases considered in this secction and Sections 5 differ in an important respect. In
the fomer a trader’s outcome only depend on the rank of his order in the queue, whereas in
the latter it depends on which orders are ranked above. Surprisingly, the techologies that
ensure fairness in both cases are identical.
Theorem 1 A technology Q is strongly symmetric if, and only if it is weakly balanced.
Proof. See the Appendix. 
7.2 Constrained v. unconstrained RSD
A balanced technology must then consist of more queues than an strongly symmetric (or
weakly balanced) technology. The question is then how many more? We address now this
question.
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Denote by QRSD the technology corresponding to the standard (i.e., unconstrained) Ran-
dom Serial Dictatorship mechanism. That is, QRSD contains n! pairwise different queues.
For any technology Q, denote by Q the smallest technology (i.e., the technology with the
fewest number of queues) such there is exists some integer ℓ such that
|{q′ ∈ Q : q′ = q}| = ℓ× |{q′ ∈ Q : q′ = q}| for all q ∈ Q. (26)
For instance, if Q = {(i1, i2), (i1, i2), (i2, i1), (i2, i1)} then Q = {(i1, i2), (i2, i1)}. We then
have the following result.
Theorem 2 A technology Q is balanced if, and only if Q = Q
RSD
.
Proof. The only if part trivial. To prove the if part, let Q be a balanced technology and
for simplicity set Q = Q. Let q ∈ Q and assume without loss of generality that
q = i1, i2, . . . , in−2, in−1, in.
SinceQ is balanced, there exists q′ ∈ Q such that q′|in = q|in−1 . So q
′ = i1, i2, . . . , in−2, in, in−1.
Assume now that there is some k such that for any h > k it holds that for any queue q̂ such
that q̂|ih = q|ih then q̂ ∈ Q. That is, any queue of the form
i1, i2, . . . , ih−1, ih, j1, j2, . . . , jn−h, with j1, . . . , jn−h ∈ {ih, . . . , in}
belongs to Q. Consider now qik↔ik+1 |ik = i1, i2, . . . , ik−1, ik+1. So we have
qik↔ik+1 = i1, i2, . . . , ik−1, ik+1, ik, j1, . . . , jn−h (27)
with j1, . . . , jn−h ∈ {ik+2, . . . , in}. Note that so far we do not know how ik+2, . . . , in are
ranked in qik↔ik+1 . However, since Q is balanced, there is q̂ ∈ Q such that q̂|ik = q
ik↔ik+1 |ik .
So, from the induction hypothesis, for any ℓ ∈ {k, k + 2, . . . , n} if q̂ is such that q̂|iℓ =
qik↔ik+1 |iℓ , then q̂ ∈ Q. SinceQ is balanced, for any such queue q̂ and any ℓ ∈ {k, k+2, . . . , n},
there is q̃ ∈ Q such that q̃|ik+1 = q̂
iℓ↔ik+1 |iℓ. That is, q̃ is of the form
i1, i2, . . . , ik−1, iℓ, j1, j2, . . . , jn−k+1 with j1, j2, . . . , jn−k+1 ∈ {ik, ik+2, . . . , in}\{iℓ}.
From the induction hypothesis any such q̃ (i.e., however traders in {ik, ik+2, . . . , in}\{iℓ}
are ranked) belongs to Q. Hence, for any ℓ ∈ {k, k + 1, k + 2, . . . , n} and any q̂ such that
q|ik = q̂|iℓ we have q̂ ∈ Q, the desired result. 
A direct corollary of Theorem 2 is the following.
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Corollary 1 A technology Q is balanced if, and only if it is fully balanced.
Proof. Clearly, if Q is fully balanced then it is balanced. Conversely, if Q is balanced
then Q̄ = Q̄RSD. Since Q̄RSD is obviously fully balanced then so is Q. 
Corollary 2 Outcome fairness implies access fairness, that is, if Q is (fully) balanced then
Q is strongly symmetric.
Proof. Immediate from Theorem 2 because Q̄RSD is obviously strongly symmetric. 
8 Market design implications
Our results provide an unambiguous message regarding the standard design of centralized fi-
nancial exchanges: hardware constraints imposed by the switch technology cannot guarantee
fairness.
Regarding access fairness our result crucially depends on the assumption that agents
trading different securities are queued together by the same switch. One may thus deduce
that access fairness could be restored if each instrument or asset would have its own switch
(and thus its own matching engine). This solution would make sense from a theoretical
perspective, but not in practice: it would amount to have one exchange per instrument.
In recent years several modifications to the CLOB have been proposed and/or imple-
mented. A first proposal is the random-delay scheme by Harris (2013). In this scheme, upon
its receipt by the exchange, a random delay of (nominally) 0-10 milliseconds is added to
each order before it is presented to the CLOB. This random delay of course has the effect
of reordering messages received by the exchange. Since the draws from the random delay
distribution are independent, the ordering produced by the scheme is equivalent to RSD.
What this means, notwithstanding strategic behavior where a trader sends the same order
in duplicate, is that if the interval from which the delays are drawn is large enough relative
to the systemic differences in jitter among participants then the scheme can restore a notion
of equal treatment of equally fast participants on an exchange.29
29To illustrate what we mean by a buffer ‘long enough’ relative to systemic differences in an exchange’s
jitter across participants consider the following example adapted from Melton (2020). Imagine a scenario
where there are two traders that are otherwise equally fast but where one is subject to a persistent additional
29
Consider next the essence of the designs proposed by Tresser and Sturman (2002), and
subsequently by Schwartz and Wu (2013) and Budish et al. (2015), which treat time not as a
continuous variable but as one that constitutes a discrete, fixed size interval. Orders received
in the same such interval are deemed by the exchange to have been received ‘at the same
time’. If these orders were to be processed serially against the CLOB then our results tell us
that, absent any consideration of each order’s content and the prevailing best bid and offer,
RSD is necessary and sufficient. The same reasoning above about the length of the interval
relative to the size of systemic differences in exchange jitter among otherwise equally fast
participants applies here, too.
Consider finally the scheme proposed by Melton (2014b, 2017) implemented on Refinitiv
Matching for the spot foreign exchange instruments that trade on it.30 In this scheme
queues are generated only over orders that are actually competing. There is an independent
buffer and associated timer for each such group of competing orders that were received at
substantially the same time. To illustrate: if the offer on an instrument is $1.00 and two
buy orders are received for $1.01 those are both put into the ‘buy as taker’ buffer for that
instrument; but if also substantially simultaneously three bids were received with limit prices
of $0.96 those would be put into a ‘buy as maker at $0.96’ buffer for that instrument; if also
simultaneously further bids were received with limit prices of $0.98 those would go into the
‘buy as maker at $0.98’ buffer for the instrument. After each buffer’s timer has run for 3
milliseconds—the receipt of the first order in a buffer is what starts its timer—the orders
that are in it are shuffled according to a particular procedure and drained from the buffer
so as to be presented to the CLOB.
What our model tells us about queues of only competing orders is that strong symmetry
is necessary and sufficient. In practice, to defend against an advantage that otherwise might
be obtained by sending the same order in duplicate, the ‘first’ order each trader sent is
subject to RSD, then if there exist duplicates the second such orders are subject to RSD
and so on. What this means is that despite at the time the scheme was designed not having
delay by the exchange of 1 millisecond. Imagine then the interval from which the random delays are drawn
from is 0-4 milliseconds. In the resultant orderings we want each to have an equal chance of being first and














= 0.49005 ≈ 0.5.
30Refinitiv Matching was formerly known as Thomson Reuters Matching, and prior to that as Reuters
Matching. The name changes reflect ownership changes of the company.
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a formal model of fairness like the one in this paper the queues produced by the mechanism
deployed on Refinitiv Matching nevertheless exhibit fairness. As for the case in our model
where providers are canceling simultaneously with takers ‘sniping’, a policy decision was
made prior to the scheme’s implementation not to buffer cancel messages, and instead to
process them in real-time, i.e., forward them to the CLOB immediately upon their receipt.
What this means is that the RSD requirement for cancels mixing with taker orders is not
relevant to this particular scheme, though it is to the CLOB generally.
Many other ‘speed bumps’ deployed real financial exchanges, however, do not restore
fairness because they continue to rely on the network switch to perform serialization of at
least some simultaneously received orders. Many such schemes impose a fixed-length delay
on taker orders (but not cancels) to reduce ‘sniping’ but they will not ensure fairness among
equally fast taker and/or providers. Even those schemes that impose variable delays on taker
orders will not restore fairness among providers. An inventory of these speed bumps and
timeline showing their date of first introduction on real financial exchanges is provided by
Osipovich (2019).
Finally, our results also tell us about necessary and sufficient properties for queues pro-
duced for market data distribution transmitted under a unicast scheme, i.e., when market
data is specific to each trader.31 Since market data updates, which are just a contempo-
raneous snapshot of the CLOB, are a trading signal or ‘trigger’ for races among market
participants it is the queue on those updates that causes the queue at time of sending for
the orders it triggers among equally fast market participants. The process of generating a
market data update of the CLOB by first removing counterparties a participant cannot trade
with is often called credit-screening or credit-filtering (Silverman and Hoffman, 1999; Melton,
2014a; Gould et al., 2017). Unicast is thus often used in markets that tend to operate on
bilateral credit like the spot foreign exchange market. The difference between multicast and
unicast transmission schemes is illustrated in Figure 2.
Market data messages being sent from the exchange to market participants as shown in
Figure 2. These market data messages contain a point-in-time snapshot of the CLOB and
many participants have trading strategies that send order messages responsive the content
in these snapshots. Consequently, if one participants receives a snapshot before another it
31The alternative system is multicast, where the same market data is sent to all participants. This the
standard system for markets that are centrally-cleared like equity markets, because everyone can trade with















































messages for all recipients
Figure 2: Unicast vs. multicast market data distribution on an electronic financial exchange.
is as if s/he has received a ‘head-start’ over the other even if the participants are otherwise
equally fast. Since we cannot know what if any orders will be triggered by a given market
data update our results tell us that a unicast market data update scheme, to result in equal-
treatment-of-equally fast participants, must exhibit RSD (unless the differences from the
first participant receiving an update to the last participant receiving it are ‘small’ relative
to the response-time jitter of the participants, see Melton (2020)).
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A Proof of Theorem 1
Proof of Theorem 1 Observe that if |N | = 2 then strong symmetry is trivially equivalent
to balancedness.32 So henceforth we assume |N | ≥ 3.
(Only if) Let Q be a weakly balanced technology. So, for any i, j ∈ N we have
|{S ∈ Ui(Q) : |S| = k}| = |{S ∈ Uj(Q) : |S| = k}| , for k = 0, 1, . . . n− 1. (28)
Since |Ui(q)| = k implies ri(q) = k + 1, Eq. (28) is equivalent to
|{q ∈ Q : ri(q) = k + 1}| = |{q ∈ Q : rj(q) = k + 1}| , for k = 0, 1, . . . n− 1. (29)
So, Q is symmetric. We now show that QS is symmetric for any non-empty S ⊂ N . Note
that for any i ∈ S, Ui(Q
S) = {Ŝ ∩ S}Ŝ∈Ui(Q). Let i and j be any two traders in S, and
let Ŝ ∈ Ui(Q). If j /∈ Ŝ, then Ŝ ∈ Uj(Q) and thus (Ŝ ∩ S) ∈ Uj(Q
S). If j ∈ Ŝ, then
(Ŝ∪{i}\{j}) ∈ Uj(Q). Hence, ((Ŝ∪{i}\{j})∩S) ∈ Uj(Q
S). Clearly, |(Ŝ∪{i}\{j})∩S| =
|Ŝ ∩ S|. Therefore,
∣∣∣{Ŝ ∈ Ui(QS) : |Ŝ| = k}
∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣{Ŝ ∈ Uj(QS) : |Ŝ| = k}
∣∣∣ , for k = 0, 1, . . . n− 1,
which implies that QS is symmetric. 
(If) Suppose now that Q is strongly symmetric. For any trader i ∈ N and set S ⊆ N\{i},
let
Qi,S = {q ∈ Q : Ui(q) = S}. (30)
Technology Q is weakly balanced if for any two traders i, j ∈ N , and any set S ⊆ N ,
S ∈ Ui(Q) implies S ∈ Uj(Q) whenever j /∈ S, and S ∪ {i}\{j} ∈ Uj(Q) if j ∈ S. Hence,





|Qj,S| if j /∈ S
|Qj,S∪{i}\{j}| if j ∈ S.
(31)
We show that Eq. (31) holds for any set S by induction.
To begin, note that for any i ∈ N , Qi,{∅} = {q ∈ Q : ri(q) = 1}. From strong symmetry,
|{q ∈ Q : rj(q) = 1}| = |{q ∈ Q : ri(q) = 1}|. So, |Qi,{∅}| = |Qj,{∅}|. It is convenient to
distinguish between two cases, depending on whether j ∈ S.
32In this case we have for any i ∈ N and q ∈ Q, Ui(q) = {∅} or Ui(q) = N\{i}.
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Case 1: j /∈ S
For each subset R ⊆ S, q ∈ Qi,R implies q
N\S ∈ Q
N\S















j,∅ | = |Qj,∅|+|Qj,{k}|. Since Q and Q





j,∅ | and |Qi,∅| = |Qj,∅|. So |Qi,{k}| = |Qj,{k}|, which proves the claim.
Suppose now that for all sets R ⊂ N such that |R| < k and i, j /∈ R, |Qi,R| = |Qj,R|. Let
S such that |S| = k. Since QN\S is symmetric |Q
N\S
i,∅ | = |Q
N\S







The induction hypothesis thus implies |Qi,S| = |Qj,S|, the desired result.
Case 2: j ∈ S
Suppose first that S = {j}. We need to show that |Qj,{i}| = |Qi,{j}|. SinceQ is symmetric,
|Qh,∅| = |Qh′,∅|, for all h, h
′ ∈ N . Define r = |Qh,∅|.
Also, any k ∈ N , since QN\{k} is symmetric, |Q
N\{k}
h,∅ | = |Q
N\{k}
h′,∅ |, for any h, h
′ ∈ N\{k}.
Eq. (32) thus implies |Qh,{k}| = |Qh′,{k}|, for any h, h
′ ∈ N\{k}. Note that
∑
h 6=k |Qh,{k}| =




for any h, k ∈ N. (34)
Therefore, |Qi,{j}| = |Qj,{i}|.
Claim If R,R′ ⊂ N such that |R| = |R′| then
|Q
N\R
h,∅ | = |Q
N\R′
h′,∅ | for any h ∈ N\R and h
′ ∈ N\R′ . (35)
Proof of the Claim. Let k1, k
′
1 ∈ N , and let h ∈ N\{k1} and h
′ ∈ N\{k′1}. From Eq. (32),
|Q
N\{k1}




h′,∅ | = |Qh′,∅|+ |Qh′,{k′1}| . (36)













Define N1 = N\{k1, k
′
1} and Q
′ = QN1 . Since Q is strongly symmetric, Q′ is symmetric.
Let k2, k
′
2 ∈ N , and let h ∈ N\{k2} and h




h,∅ | = |Q
′N1\{k′2}
h′,∅ |. Since Q





















4}, . . . yields
|Q
N\{S}
h,∅ | = |Q
N\S′
h′,∅ | for any S, S
′ such that |S| = |S ′|, which proves the claim. 




+ |Qi,{k}|︸ ︷︷ ︸
= r
n−1
+ |Qi,{j}|︸ ︷︷ ︸
= r
n−1
+|Qi,{jk}| = |Qj,∅|︸ ︷︷ ︸
=r
+ |Qj,{k}|︸ ︷︷ ︸
= r
n−1




⇔ |Qi,{jk}| = |Qj,{ik}| . (38)
We can now show that |Qi,S| = |Qj,S∪{j}\{i} for any set S ⊆ N\{i} such that j ∈ S.
Assume that this equality holds for any set R such that |R| < k, and let S such that |S| = k.
Let S ′ = S ∪ {j}\{i}. Since |Q
N\S
i,∅ | = |Q
N\S′
















|Qi,R|+ |Qj,S′ | . (39)

















|Qi,R|. So we obtain |Qi,S| = |Qj,S′ |, the desired result. 
References
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